Kristy Humpery, et al. v. Duke Energy Indiana, Inc.
Kristy Humphery, as personal representative of the estate of Charles Mandrell, Jr., appeals from the trial court’s summary judgment for Duke Energy Indiana, Inc. (“Duke Energy”). Humphery alleged in her complaint that Duke Energy acted negligently when it placed a utility pole near an intersection in Johnson County, which became a proximate cause of Mandrell’s death. On appeal, the parties dispute only whether Duke Energy could have reasonably foreseen Mandrell’s collision with its utility pole.* * *
In sum, we hold that the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment to Duke Energy. It is for a jury, not a court, to determine whether Duke Energy could have reasonably foreseen a motorist’s collision with the Pole. There is a genuine question of material fact as to whether the location of the Pole was inherently dangerous. Reversed and remanded.
Steve Ankeny and Bill Kruse v. Governor of the State of Indiana
Plaintiffs challenged Gov. Daniels’ certification of Indiana’s vote for electors in last Nov’s election. The opinion includes a number of footnotes, including this one:
16 We note that President Obama is not the first U.S. President born of parents of differing citizenship. Chester A. Arthur, the twenty-first U.S. President, was born of a mother who was a United States citizen and a father who was an Irish citizen. See THOMAS C. REEVES, GENTLEMAN BOSS, THE LIFE OF CHESTER ALAN ARTHUR 3-4 (1975). During the election of 1880, there arose a rumor “that [Arthur] had been born in Canada, rather than in Vermont as he claimed, and was thus constitutionally ineligible to become the Chief Executive.” Id. at 3. Although President Arthur’s status as a natural born citizen was challenged in the 1880 Presidential Election on the grounds that he was born in Canada rather than Vermont, the argument was not made that because Arthur’s father was an Irish citizen he was constitutionally ineligible to be President. See generally id.
The opinion concludes:
The Plaintiffs do not mention the above United States Supreme Court authority in their complaint or brief; they primarily rely instead on an eighteenth century treatise and quotations of Members of Congress made during the nineteenth century. To the extent that these authorities conflict with the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of what it means to be a natural born citizen, we believe that the Plaintiffs’ arguments fall under the category of “conclusory, non-factual assertions or legal conclusions” that we need not accept as true when reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Irish, 864 N.E.2d at 1120. Thus, we cannot say that the trial court erred when it dismissed the Plaintiffs’ case.[16] See generally McCalment v. Eli Lilly & Co., 860 N.E.2d 884 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that the plaintiffs’ arguments had been sufficiently addressed by Indiana Supreme Court precedent and therefore the trial court did not err when it granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted); see also, e.g., Diaz-Salazar v. I.N.S., 700 F.2d 1156, 1160 (7th Cir. 1983) (noting in its recitation of the facts that despite the fact father was not a citizen of the United States, he had children who were “natural-born citizens of the United States”), cert. denied 462 U.S. 1132, 103 S. Ct. 3112 (1983).
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s grant of the Governor’s motion to dismiss.
Dennis Barnett v. State of Indiana
“Dennis Barnett appeals his convictions for two counts of child molesting as class C felonies. Barnett raises two issues which we revise and restate as: I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Barnett’s motion for mistrial; and II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by excluding Barnett’s videotaped statement to the police. We affirm.”